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THE (UN)INFORMED USE OF CREDIT: THE 
NEED TO CLARIFY CONSUMERS’ RIGHT OF 
RESCISSION UNDER THE TRUTH IN 
LENDING ACT 
Alan Ritchie 
          Currently, over 1 million properties in the United States are in 
some stage of foreclosure. Although foreclosure rates have decreased in 
recent years, they remain significantly higher than pre-lending-crisis 
rates, revealing that foreclosure is relatively commonplace in the 
current housing market. As such, consumers increasingly rely on 
consumer protection laws to provide security against the threat of 
foreclosure and unfair credit practices. The Federal Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA) was enacted to assure meaningful disclosure of credit and 
finance terms in consumer credit transactions. Among the various 
remedies available under TILA, consumers have the right to rescind the 
entire credit transaction if the lender fails to make certain disclosures. 
Section 1635(f) provides that a consumer must exercise his or her right 
to rescind within three years of the loan’s consummation, or the right 
expires. Thus, the question becomes: how does a consumer exercise his 
or her right to rescind under TILA? According to the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuit Courts of Appeal, a consumer must file an action for rescission 
to exercise his or her right to rescind under Section 1635(f). On the 
other hand, the Fourth Circuit, relying largely on the Federal Reserve 
Board’s regulations to TILA, held that a consumer exercises his or her 
right to rescind merely by sending notice to the lender within the 
statutory three-year period. This Note explores the split of authority on 
consumers’ right to rescind under TILA and ultimately proposes that 
the Fourth Circuit’s holding be reversed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
 
  J.D. May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science, Northwestern 
University, June 2011. I would like to thank Professor Bryan Hull for his invaluable guidance and 
support in writing this Note. I would also like to thank the staffers and editors of the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review for their much appreciated contributions. Finally, special thanks to 
Ashley Scoughton and my family for all of their love and encouragement.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a scenario in which a mortgage lender receives a fax 
just hours before a foreclosure sale, informing the lender that the 
borrower—the previous owner of the foreclosed residence—is 
rescinding the initial loan because certain required disclosures were 
absent from the loan documents. As a result, the lender is now 
obligated to reconvey the deed of trust and return all fees and interest 
payments the borrower made on the loan.1 Can the borrower lawfully 
rescind the contract in this situation? Yes. As this Note highlights 
below, consumers may rescind specific contracts within three years 
of their consummation under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) if the 
lender fails to disclose certain required information.2 
Now imagine that the lender, having knowledge that such an 
action is possible up to three years after the initial loan’s 
consummation, has planned accordingly and held the foreclosure sale 
two months after the statutory three-year period has passed. This 
time, the original borrower files an action to rescind the initial loan 
for the same reason. The case goes to trial and the court rules in 
favor of the borrower. Has the court decided correctly here? Can the 
borrower lawfully rescind the agreement after the statutory three-
year period has run? The Supreme Court, in Beach v. Ocwen Federal 
Bank,3 appeared to answer this question in the negative.4 However, 
recent circuit court decisions have signified a split of authority 
regarding the temporal life of consumers’ rescission rights, making 
the answer to the question posed above contingent upon the federal 
jurisdiction in which the action arises. 
In 2012, the Fourth Circuit held that a consumer could bring a 
rescission action after TILA’s three-year period, as long as the 
consumer delivered sufficient notice of rescission to the lender 
within the statutory time frame.5 In contrast, the Ninth6 and Tenth7 
 
 1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. 523 U.S. 410 (1998). “[T]he Act permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or 
otherwise, after the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run.” Id. at 419. 
 4. See id. at 410 (“A borrower may not assert the § 1635 right to rescind . . . after 
§ 1635(f)'s 3-year period has run.”). 
 5. Id. at 278. 
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Circuits have each declared that a consumer must exercise his or her 
right to rescind by filing suit within three years of the loan’s 
consummation, or that right is completely extinguished. Although 
circuit splits are commonplace in American jurisprudence,8 the split 
of authority examined in this Note, in the context of a depressed and 
unstable housing market, significantly threatens the basic 
foundations9 of TILA and its supplemental regulations by 
establishing indefinite and variable constraints on consumer 
rescission rights.10 
Currently, over 1 million properties in the United States are in 
some stage of foreclosure.11 In fact, in August 2014 alone, one in 
every 1126 housing units nationwide received a foreclosure filing.12 
Although foreclosure rates have decreased in recent years, they 
remain significantly higher than pre-lending-crisis rates,13 revealing 
the relative commonplace of foreclosure in the current housing 
market. As such, while consumers grapple with the decision of 
whether they should enter into a mortgage loan transaction, “one of 
the most complex financial transactions of a consumer’s life,”14 they 
increasingly rely on consumer protection laws, such as TILA, to 
provide security against the threat of foreclosure and unfair credit 
practices.15 Specifically, TILA permits consumers to rescind certain 
credit transactions within statutorily defined timeframes.16 However, 
 
 6. Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 7. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 8. Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by 
Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605, 605–06 
(2003). 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Parts III.B–C, IV.B.1–2. 
 11. See National Real Estate Trends & Market Info, REALTYTRAC, http:// 
www.realtytrac.com/statsandtrends (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (defining “some stage of 
foreclosure” as including default, auction, or bank owned). 
 12. See National Real Estate Trends, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter 
/trend.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (“The foreclosure rate is calculated by dividing the total 
housing units in the state (based on the most recent estimate from the U.S. Census bureau) by the 
total number of properties that received foreclosure filings during the month (using most recent 
monthly data available), and that number is expressed as a ratio.”). 
 13. See Marcy Gordon, US Foreclosure Filings Hit 5-year Low in September, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 11, 2012, 7:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20121011/us 
-foreclosure-rates/. 
 14. Lea Krivinskas Shepard, It's All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers' Right of 
Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171, 171 (2010). 
 15. See id. at 188–89. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
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the split of authority regarding the temporal life of that right 
threatens not only to undermine many of the central goals of TILA17 
but also to hinder economic growth and stability.18 
Part II of this Note explores the current state of the law, 
beginning with a discussion of TILA’s history and the congressional 
intent behind TILA’s passage. It then provides an overview of the 
right of rescission, both at common law and under TILA and its 
accompanying regulations. Finally, Part II summarizes the relevant 
case law, including the Supreme Court’s holding in Beach, the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA,19 and the 
Fourth Circuit’s contrasting opinion in Gilbert v. Residential 
Funding, LLC.20 
Part III of this Note examines the primary problems with the 
current state of the law regarding consumers’ rescission rights. The 
split of authority has weakened federal TILA regulations and 
presented various interpretive issues for consumers, lenders, and 
judges alike.21 The differing interpretations of TILA and its 
regulations weaken basic foundations of consumer protection 
legislation, including consumer leverage, lender protection, and 
economic stability.22 
Part IV of this Note proposes a judicial solution to the split of 
authority. Specifically, the Supreme Court should invalidate the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding in Gilbert and expressly uphold the 
decisions in Beach and the Ninth and Tenth circuits.23 In support of 
this proposal, Part IV engages in a prototypical plain language 
analysis of the applicable statutes and regulations, applies the judicial 
precedent in Beach, and examines various policy considerations. 
Finally, Part V justifies the proposal by arguing that it supports 
the congressional intent behind TILA’s passage, promotes economic 
certainty and stability, and preserves statutory consumer leverage. 
Ultimately, this Note seeks to provide a tangible and principled 
solution to a current and significant problem. As discussed below, 
 
 17. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 18. See infra Part III.C. 
 19. 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 20. 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 23. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d 1172; Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
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TILA, with its accompanying administrative regulations, comprises 
the paramount consumer protection directive. However, the legal 
status quo, represented by a split of authority, ultimately hinders 
TILA’s consumer protection purpose by reducing consumer leverage 
and injecting uncertainty into an already uncertain and fragile 
lending market. By invalidating the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Gilbert, as this Note proposes, the Supreme Court can clearly 
identify the temporal boundary of the right of rescission under TILA 
and, as a result, support and adhere to Congress’s original intent, 
protect consumer leverage, and promote economic strength and 
stability. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
To understand the current state of consumer rescission rights, it 
is necessary to discuss the federal statutory provisions that define and 
limit these rights, the supplemental administrative regulations that 
clarify and expand upon these federal provisions, and the judicial 
interpretations of both the provisions and regulations. The first 
section discusses the origin and basic premise behind Congress’s 
first major foray into consumer protection, TILA. The second section 
examines the specific rescission provisions of TILA and the Federal 
Reserve Board’s (the “Board”) accompanying regulations 
(collectively known as “Regulation Z”). Finally, the remaining 
sections summarize significant case law addressing the right to 
rescind under TILA, including the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Beach, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Rosenfield, and the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion in Gilbert. 
A.  Consumer Protection Codified:  
The Truth in Lending Act 
TILA, a progeny of President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great 
Society” ideals,24 is a strict liability statute that requires credit 
lenders to clearly and accurately disclose certain terms and 
 
 24. Shepard, supra note 14, at 184; see also LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Remarks at the 
University of Michigan (May 22, 1964), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1963–64 704, 704–07, available at http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu 
/~hst306/documents/great.html (discussing the erosion of community bonds, poverty, urban 
decay, and inadequate education). 
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conditions to consumers in credit transactions.25 Its passage in 1968 
“marked the birth of modern consumer legislative activism”26 and 
resulted in a wave of subsequent federal and state consumer credit 
protection laws.27 Prior to TILA’s enactment, the consumer credit 
landscape suffered from a debilitating combination of deregulation 
and preemption of state consumer laws by weak federal legislation.28 
For example, consumers often found it difficult or impossible to shop 
for credit, because unsupervised creditors used various methods of 
calculating interest and determining which additional charges would 
be included in the interest rate, resulting in vague and multifarious 
interest calculations across the lending market.29 Furthermore, 
according to Senator Paul H. Douglas, creditors often 
compound[ed] the camouflaging of credit by loading on all 
sorts of extraneous fees, such as exorbitant fees for credit 
life insurance, excessive fees for credit investigation, and all 
sorts of loan processing fees . . . so that any percentage rate 
quoted [was] completely meaningless and deceptive.30 
Finally, consumer confusion was further aggravated by the fact that 
creditors often buried essential information in legalese and fine 
print.31 
Congress enacted TILA to protect consumers from “inaccurate 
and unfair credit” practices,32 “increase transparency” in the credit 
markets, and promote the “informed use of credit.”33 The statute 
applies to virtually all forms of consumer credit transactions—from 
credit card plans to small loans to home mortgages.34 Essentially, the 
 
 25. See RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 2 (Supp. 2009). 
 26. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN 
LENDING § 1.2.1, at 4 (6th ed. 2007). 
 27. See id. (“Subsequently, Truth in Lending became just one of several titles in the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act which encompasses much of the other federal consumer 
legislation which followed. Some states now have enacted their own truth in lending acts or 
similar consumer credit disclosure laws.”); ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 1 (“[I]t 
explored new territory, and other federal consumer credit laws followed in its path.”). 
 28. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 2; Shepard, supra note 14, at 184. 
 29. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 1. 
 30. 109 CONG. REC. 2029 (1963) (statement of Sen. Douglas). 
 31. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 2. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). 
 33. Shepard, supra note 14, at 185 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)). 
 34. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 2; see also Shepard, supra note 14, at 185–86 
(“TILA's application is broad-ranging from open-end credit transactions like credit card and home 
equity loans to closed-end transactions like car loans and mortgages.”). 
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provisions of TILA apply whenever a creditor35 offers or extends 
credit, subject to a finance charge,36 to a consumer37 for personal, 
family, or household purposes.38 As a disclosure statute, TILA 
primarily requires creditors to disclose the true cost of credit prior to 
the consummation of the credit transaction by using standardized 
terminology established by the act itself and by the Board.39 The cost 
of credit at its most basic level includes the “finance charge”40—the 
total dollar cost of credit—and the “annual percentage rate”41—“the 
annualized simple interest rate of that finance charge.”42 However, 
Congress has appended numerous other terms to the cost of credit, 
terms that often do not affect the actual cost, such as default charges 
and security interests.43 In addition, the statute also contains 
numerous regulatory provisions to prevent substantive abuses by 
creditors that cannot be fully addressed through mandatory 
disclosures alone.44 Thus, notwithstanding TILA’s conception as a 
pure disclosure statute, it has functioned, for all intents and purposes, 
as a comprehensive consumer credit protection statute.45 
 
 35. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17) (2013) (“Creditor means: A person who regularly extends 
consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in more 
than four installments (not including a down payment), and to whom the obligation is initially 
payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by agreement when there is no note or 
contract.”). 
 36. Id. § 226.4(a) (“The finance charge is the cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount. It 
includes any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or 
indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit. It does not 
include any charge of a type payable in a comparable cash transaction.”). 
 37. Id. § 226.2(a)(11) (“Consumer means a cardholder or natural person to whom consumer 
credit is offered or extended. However, for purposes of rescission . . . the term also includes a 
natural person in whose principal dwelling a security interest is or will be retained or acquired, if 
that person's ownership interest in the dwelling is or will be subject to the security interest.”). 
 38. Shepard, supra note 14, at 185–86. 
 39. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 4–5. 
 40. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (defining “finance charge”). 
 41. Id. § 226.14(a) (defining “annual percentage rate”). 
 42. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 3. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 2 (“[T]he Act includes qualified or absolute prohibitions on prepayment 
penalties, balloon payments, increases in interest upon default, negative amortization, prepaid 
payments, extending credit without adequate consideration of repayment ability, and direct lender 
to contractor payments in certain high rate/high fee residential mortgages; limitations on 
acceleration and changes in terms in home equity plans and reverse mortgages; and limitations on 
the liability of a cardholder for unauthorized use and on the ability of a card issue to enforce 
payment if there is a valid defense to payment.”). 
 45. Id. 
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Since its enactment in 1968, TILA has been amended and 
revised several times.46 One notable revision occurred in 1980 when 
President Jimmy Carter signed the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which included the 
Truth in Lending Simplification Act (the “Simplification Act”).47 
The Simplification Act, unlike previous amendments that merely 
clarified technical terms, changed the basic philosophy of TILA.48 
The revised TILA trimmed much of the unnecessary and confusing 
disclosure requirements and retained only the information Congress 
deemed useful to a consumer’s credit decisions.49 For example, an 
itemized disclosure of the amount financed was no longer required, 
because the resulting complexity could often make it more difficult 
for a consumer to detect inaccurate disclosures.50 TILA again saw 
substantial change in 1994 as a result of the predatory lending 
crisis.51 Congress amended TILA by passing the Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection Act, which enhanced certain disclosure 
requirements for statutorily defined “high cost” mortgages exceeding 
certain price-threshold triggers.52 Finally, most recently, in response 
to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Board added a new category of 
“higher-priced mortgage loans” subject to heightened disclosure 
requirements by the Board’s regulations.53 
Although TILA has been amended and supplemented various 
times over the past four decades, it has retained its original consumer 
protection initiative by providing borrowers with the tools and 
information necessary to make informed credit decisions. 
B.  A Consumer’s Controversial Sword:  
TILA’s Right of Rescission 
TILA provides consumers with access to a variety of remedies 
when creditors violate various provisions of the statute.54 Expectedly, 
consumers may bring an action for actual and statutory damages, 
 
 46. Id. at 1. 
 47. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 5. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Shepard, supra note 14, at 187. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 187–88. 
 54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006). 
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correction of billing errors and reporting errors, crediting of 
payments, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.55 However, TILA 
provides an even more potent remedy to consumers for violations of 
certain disclosure provisions—rescission.56 
At its most basic level, rescission is a legal remedy, sought 
unilaterally or mutually, that returns the parties of a contract to their 
pre-contractual positions by discharging both parties of their 
obligations.57 At common law, a borrower seeking to rescind a loan 
on the basis of the lender’s fraudulent misrepresentation had to prove 
the following elements: “(1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its 
materiality, (4) the [lender’s] knowledge of the representation’s 
falsity or ignorance of its truth (scienter), and (5) the borrower’s 
justifiable reliance on the representation.”58 In addition, the borrower 
was also required to bring the rescission action within a “reasonable 
time”59 after the transaction and take the first steps in restoring the 
lender to the status quo ante.60 However, during the 1960s, many 
states began to adopt laws that granted consumers a right to cancel 
certain kinds of consumer contracts that were thought to be 
especially prone to fraud and predatory practices within established 
“cooling-off periods.”61 Eventually, Congress borrowed from these 
state cooling-off periods, which permit a consumer to unilaterally 
withdraw from a contractual relationship within a statutorily defined 
timeframe, and incorporated this rescission mechanism into TILA.62 
However, the statutory right of rescission is not unlimited. 
Under § 1635(a), the right of rescission extends only to transactions 
involving non-purchase-money mortgages on consumer dwellings.63 
In other words, if, as part of a credit transaction other than for the 
purchase of a home, the creditor acquires or retains a security interest 
 
 55. See id.; RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 379; Shepard, supra note 14, at 186. 
 56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006). 
 57. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1420 (9th ed. 2009). 
 58. Shepard, supra note 14, at 188 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 59. See Warner v. Denis, 933 P.2d 1372, 1385 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “[t]he 
right of rescission must be exercised within a reasonable time after the default of the other 
party”). 
 60. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 188–89 (“[T]he borrower had to return the loan proceeds 
to the lender before the court would require the lender to terminate its security interest in the 
borrower's home and return accrued interest and fees.”). 
 61. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 10. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006). 
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in the consumer’s principal dwelling, the consumer may rescind the 
transaction during the statutory cooling-off period.64 TILA provides 
consumers with a three-day period “to reflect on the wisdom and 
desirability of the contract and on the risk of possible loss of the 
home.”65 Within the three-day period, the consumer is free to rescind 
any consummated agreement for any reason.66 However, if the 
creditor fails to disclose, or improperly discloses important TILA 
requirements, and the homeowner does not sell the home, the right of 
rescission may extend to three years.67 The specific temporal life of 
the right of rescission is governed by § 1635(f), which states that “an 
obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of 
consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, 
whichever occurs first.”68 Problems arise when courts, interpreting 
and applying the language of § 1635(f) and the Board’s Regulation 
Z,69 apply different meanings to the phrase “exercise of right,”70 
resulting in a right to rescind that may be “exercised” beyond the 
statutory three-year period in some circuits71 but not in others.72 
Thus, it is no surprise that the consumer’s right to rescind was the 
most heavily litigated TILA issue of 2012.73 
C.  “The Fed” Weighs In: 
The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z 
Early on, Congress recognized that the oversight of consumer 
credit is complex, arduous, and generally beyond the legislature’s 
 
 64. Shepard, supra note 14, at 186. 
 65. Id. (quoting RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING ¶ 8.01[1], at 598 
(Robert A. Cook et al. eds., 2000)). 
 66. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 10. 
 67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1645; Shepard, supra note 14, at 187 (“The consumer's three-day 
rescission right extends to three years if the creditor fails to provide the consumer with a notice 
describing the rescission right or with material information about the loan, including the APR, 
finance charge, amount financed, total number of payments, and payment schedule.”). 
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
 69. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (2008), invalidated by In re Smith-Pena, 484 B.R. 512 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2013). 
 70. See id. § 226.23(a)(2) (“To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the 
creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of written communication.”). 
 71. See Gilbert v. Residential Funding, LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 72. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012); McOmie-Gray v. Bank 
of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 73. Arthur Axelson & Richard Vance, Truth in Lending Update—2011, 67 BUS. LAW. 541, 
549 (2012). 
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administrative capacity.74 Therefore, Congress delegated broad 
authority to the Board to implement, clarify, and expand upon75 
TILA’s provisions.76 The Board responded by implementing a 
comprehensive set of TILA rules and regulations, collectively known 
as Regulation Z, which have been in effect since July 1, 1969.77 The 
Board amended Regulation Z numerous times between 1969 and 
1981 to reflect the Board’s own determination to clarify, modify, or 
expand the rules.78 In 1981, Regulation Z was completely rewritten 
to embody changes mandated by the Simplification Act and to 
streamline the remaining provisions where no substantive changes 
were necessary.79 For the purposes of this article, “Regulation Z” 
will stand for the 1981 revised version of the Board’s regulations. 
Regulation Z is indispensable in dealing with TILA provisions 
because the Board is able, under Congress’s express authorization, to 
modify, expand and refine the provisions mandated in TILA.80 For 
example, Regulation Z may provide options or may require 
disclosures not specifically mentioned in the statutory framework of 
TILA.81 As such, Regulation Z is considered to be the truth in 
lending law in most82 operational aspects.83 
The Board’s answer to the uncertainties surrounding the three-
year rescission period under § 1635(f) can be found in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.23(a)(2), which states: “[t]o exercise the right to rescind, the 
consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, 
or other means of written communication.”84 Nevertheless, continued 
 
 74. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559 (1980) (“Because of their 
complexity and variety, however, credit transactions defy exhaustive regulation by a single 
statute.”); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 13. 
 75. See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 30 (“This is not presumptuous action by the 
Board, but rather is consistent with Congress' expressed authorization that the Board should have 
the power to adjust the ground rules as it believes necessary or proper to achieve the purposes of 
the Act or to prevent circumvention or evasion of the Act's provisions.”). 
 76. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 13; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 29. 
 77. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 13. 
 78. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 29. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 30. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. (“Nonetheless because on occasion the Board has been found to have exceeded 
its authority, it is important to determine if that may be the case with respect to a given issue.”); 
see, e.g., In re Stanley, 315 B.R. 602, 615 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (holding that 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.23(d)(4) (2008) is not a permissible interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2010)). 
 83. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 25, at 30. 
 84. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2008). 
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litigation has resulted in a split of authority regarding the 
interpretation of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z—that is, “whether the 
borrower must file a lawsuit within three years after the 
consummation of a loan transaction to exercise her right to rescind, 
or whether the borrower need only assert the right to rescind through 
a written notice within the three-year period.”85 
In the following sections, this Note will discuss recent Supreme 
Court holdings and two conflicting circuit court opinions regarding 
the interpretation and application of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z. 
D.  The Supreme Court Addresses Rescission:  
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank 
David and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida home in 1986 
with a loan from Great Western Bank.86 After the Beaches stopped 
making payments in 1991, Great Western initiated a foreclosure 
proceeding.87 The Beaches acknowledged their default but raised an 
affirmative defense, alleging that Great Western failed to make 
disclosures required by TILA and thus, the Beaches argued, they had 
a defensive right under § 1635(f) to rescind the mortgage 
agreement.88 
Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, 
held that the Beaches’ recoupment defense was barred because TILA 
“permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after 
the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run.”89 The Court expressly 
concluded that the three-year period of § 1635(f) did not operate as a 
statute of limitations governing the institution of a suit, but rather as 
a statute of repose governing the underlying right of rescission.90 In 
analyzing the congressional intent behind TILA, the Court concluded 
that the inclusion of recoupment language in § 1640(e)91 and its 
 
 85. Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 86. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 413 (1998). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 413–14. 
 89. Id. at 419. 
 90. Id. at 410. 
 91.  
Subsection (e) reads that the 1-year limit on actions for damages “does not bar a person 
from asserting a violation of this subchapter in an action to collect the debt which was 
brought more than one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation as a matter 
of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action, except as otherwise provided by 
State law.” 
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simultaneous absence in § 1635(f) proved that Congress ultimately 
did not intend to provide the same kind of flexibility in rescission 
claims as it did in claims for damages.92 However, the Court 
acknowledged that a borrower might have hope of recoupment 
outside of the three-year statutory period under state law.93 
The Court’s holding in Beach clearly established that TILA does 
not permit any federal right to rescind defensively after the three-year 
period of § 1635(f) has run.94 However, Beach left some important 
issues unresolved.95 The first issue is how § 1635(f) should be 
interpreted with respect to affirmative, as opposed to defensive, 
actions of rescission. Second, and related to the first, is the issue of 
how a borrower actually exercises his or her right to rescind under 
§ 1635(f) and Regulation Z. The following circuit court decisions 
address these issues. 
E.  The Tenth Circuit Concurs: Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank 
In Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, Jean Rosenfield refinanced 
an existing loan on her home on November 3, 2006.96 That “loan was 
subsequently sold or assigned to HSBC Bank.”97 Believing that the 
original lender had violated several federal statutes, including TILA, 
Rosenfield sent a notice of rescission letter to the lender on 
September 9, 2008.98 Convinced that she had legally rescinded the 
transaction, Rosenfield ceased paying her mortgage.99 As a result, 
HSBC instituted a foreclosure proceeding against her on July 9, 
2009.100 On December 21, 2009, more than three years after the loan 
transaction, Rosenfield sued HSBC, asserting claims for relief based 
on her alleged right to rescind the loan under § 1635(f).101 
 
Id. at 417–18 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2010)). 
 92. Id. at 418. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 419. 
 95. See Elwin Griffith, Searching For the Truth in Lending: Identifying Some Problems in 
the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 350 (2000). 
 96. 681 F.3d 1172, 1175 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 97. Id. at 1176. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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The court held that written notice of rescission was “not enough 
for a consumer to invoke her right to rescission under TILA.”102 The 
court reasoned that, “consistent with Beach, TILA establishes a right 
of action that is generally redressable only when a party seeks 
recognition of it by invoking the power of the courts.”103 Thus, the 
court held, it is the filing of an action in court, not mere notice, that is 
required to invoke the right of rescission under § 1635(f).104 The 
court further opined that notice of rescission is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for the exercise of the TILA right of 
rescission.105 
Thus, Rosenfield closely mirrored the analysis and holding in 
Beach, emphasizing that consumers must file an action of rescission 
to properly exercise their right to rescind under § 1635(f) and 
Regulation Z.106 
F.  The Fourth Circuit Paves a New Path:  
Gilbert v. Residential Funding, LLC 
In Gilbert v. Residential Funding, LLC, Rex and Daniela Gilbert 
executed a note to refinance an existing lien on their home on May 5, 
2006.107 Residential Funding, LLC, eventually acquired the 
interest.108 The Gilberts defaulted on the loan in 2008 and, facing 
foreclosure, wrote a letter dated April 5, 2009 to the mortgage lender 
providing notice that the Gilberts were rescinding the transaction 
based on alleged TILA violations.109 After the foreclosure 
proceeding had been resolved against the Gilberts, and while their 
appeal was pending, the Gilberts filed suit on September 14, 2009, 
against Residential Funding, LLC, seeking to rescind the May 5, 
2006 loan.110 
The court acknowledged that there was a “split of authority as to 
whether the borrower must file a lawsuit within three years after the 
consummation of a loan transaction to exercise her right to rescind, 
 
 102. Id. at 1182. 
 103. Id. at 1183 (footnote omitted). 
 104. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183. 
 105. Id. at 1185. 
 106. Id. at 1183. 
 107. 678 F.3d 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 274–75. 
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or whether the borrower need only to assert the right to rescind 
through a written notice within the three-year period.”111 Relying on 
a plain language analysis of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z,112 the court 
held that “a borrower exercises her right to rescission by merely 
communicating in writing to her creditor her intention to rescind.”113 
The court continued that courts “must not conflate the issue of 
whether a borrower has exercised her right to rescind with the issue 
of whether the rescission has, in fact, been completed and the 
contract voided.”114 
Further, the court stated that the Supreme Court in Beach failed 
to address the “proper method of exercising a right to rescind or the 
timely exercise of that right.”115 Rather, the Supreme Court, 
according to Gilbert, held that § 1635(f) extinguished the 
foundational right for the claim, not that a borrower is required to 
“file a claim for the invocation of that right.”116 
The Fourth Circuit’s singular holding in Gilbert is significant 
because it challenges the previously uniform interpretations of 
Beach, § 1635(f), and Regulation Z found in Rosenfield and similarly 
decided circuit court opinions.117 Thus, until or unless the Supreme 
Court strikes down Gilbert, Congress amends § 1635(f), or the Board 
amends Regulation Z, the current conflicting interpretations of 
TILA’s rescission provision will remain valid law in their respective 
 
 111. Id. at 276. 
 112. Id. at 277. 
Taking the plain meaning of these texts, and assuming that the words say what they 
mean and mean what they say, we come to the conclusion that the Gilberts exercised 
their right to rescind with the April 5, 2009, letter. Simply stated, neither 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635(f) nor Regulation Z says anything about the filing of a lawsuit, and we refuse to 
graft such a requirement upon them. 
Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 278. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See also McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“[U]nder the case law of this court and the Supreme Court, rescission suits must be 
brought within three years from the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of 
rescission is delivered within that three-year period.”); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 
F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (“[S]ection 1635(f) represents an ‘absolute 
limitation on rescission actions’ which bars any claims filed more than three years after the 
consummation of the transaction. Therefore, § 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts 
of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation 
period.”). 
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jurisdictions. As a result, the current state of the law will remain 
burdened with inconsistency and uncertainty. 
III.  THE STATUS QUO FAVORS NO ONE: A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT 
LAW 
The current state of the law, discussed above, disfavors 
consumers by potentially weakening their statutory right to rescind118 
and increasing economic uncertainty in a frail market.119 The 
following sections address the problems arising from the current split 
of authority, including the judicial weakening of the Board’s 
regulation, the dilution of consumers’ statutory leverage, and the 
economic risks of preserving the status quo. 
A.  The Circuits Disagree: How Regulation Z 
Fails to Clarify Section 1635(f) 
As discussed above, § 1635(f) provides that consumers may 
rescind certain loan transactions up to three years after 
consummation of the loan.120 Even before venturing into the issues 
and uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of the provision, one 
can imagine complications arising from such a lengthy rescission 
period. For example, a three-year rescission period complicates any 
attempt to return parties to their pre-transaction states when the 
property has significantly depreciated in value.121 In addition, 
consumers are able to rescind upon discovering a defect in the 
disclosure, even if the discovery comes after related or unrelated 
complications with the loan arise.122 However, Congress accounted 
for these potential consequences and included § 1635(f) in TILA 
because encumbering the family home via a credit transaction is a 
major decision that deserves serious reflection absent creditor 
pressure.123 Thus, it appears that Congress’s intent to encourage the 
“informed use of credit”124 by consumers trumped the foreseeable 
complications attributable to the statutory three-year rescission 
 
 118. See infra Part V.B. 
 119. See infra Part V.C. 
 120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(2)–(3) (2008). 
 121. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 189–90 (“[T]he borrower therefore is unable to finance 
her tender obligation by selling her home or refinancing the mortgage.”). 
 122. Id. at 190. 
 123. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 401. 
 124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). 
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period in § 1635(f). But, what if that three-year period was not 
actually three years? More broadly, are there currently any 
procedures or guidelines in place to address the inevitable 
interpretive questions arising from the statutory language and 
construction of § 1635(f)? 
The latter question can be answered in the affirmative. Congress 
delegated expansive authority to the Board “to elaborate and expand 
the legal framework governing commerce in credit.”125 In fact, 
congressional intent reveals a “decided preference for resolving 
interpretive issues by uniform administrative decision, rather than 
piecemeal through litigation.”126 While it is clear that courts often 
further legislative goals by filling gaps in the wake of congressional 
silence,127 the Supreme Court has expressly concluded that “judges 
ought to refrain from substituting their own interstitial lawmaking for 
that of the Federal Reserve, so long as the latter’s lawmaking is not 
irrational.”128 
In fact, administrative agencies are generally better suited to 
engage in the interpretation of legislative statutes.129 Interpretation 
often involves a highly intricate “empirical process that entails 
investigation into consumer psychology and . . . presupposes broad 
experience with credit practices.”130 Courts that attempt to interpret 
legislative purpose, without deference to an administrative agency 
like the Board, are said to be “embarking upon a voyage without a 
compass.”131 Hence, great deference should be afforded to the Board 
and “absent some obvious repugnance to the statute, the . . . 
regulation implementing [TILA] should be accepted by the 
courts.”132 
However, the circuit courts that have encountered § 1635(f) 
interpretive issues have disagreed about the deference given to the 
language in Regulation Z.133 This lack of judicial consensus, 
 
 125. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1980). 
 126. Id. at 568. 
 127. Id. at 565. 
 128. Id. at 568; see Gilbert v. Residential Funding, LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219 (1981)). 
 129. Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 569. 
 130. Id. at 568–69. 
 131. Id. at 568. 
 132. Anderson Bros. Ford, 452 U.S. at 219. 
 133. Compare Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277 (assuming that the words in Regulation Z say what 
they mean and mean what they say; that a borrower exercises her right of rescission by sending 
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combined with the absence of a Federal Reserve Board Staff opinion 
applying Regulation Z’s notice requirement to § 1635(f), creates 
uncertainty with respect to the deference afforded to, and the 
interpretation of, Regulation Z for consumers, lenders, and judges. In 
turn, the resulting lack of clarity could lead to a more hesitant 
mortgage and lending market, harming the economic interests of 
both lenders and borrowers.134 
B.  Rescission Diluted: How the Split in Authority 
Harms Consumer Leverage 
Borrowers are generally unsophisticated actors who possess 
comparatively less leverage in loan negotiations than their more 
sophisticated lending counterparts.135 The resulting disparity in 
bargaining power often leads to borrower vulnerability.136 Thus, 
TILA’s rescission provisions “shift[] significant leverage from 
lenders to borrowers in setting forth a strict liability remedy that 
substantially liberalizes the steps needed to unwind a mortgage 
transaction under the common law.”137 At least one commentator has 
argued that the statutory right of rescission in § 1635(f) is the 
singular source of borrower leverage in a tumultuous legal and 
economic environment.138 
Since rescission is such an important “weapon in the arsenal of 
consumer advocates,”139 the current uncertainty regarding its 
 
notice), with Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172, 1185 (10th Cir. 2012) (interpreting the 
language of Regulation Z to mean that notice is a necessary predicate to the act of exercising the 
right, but not sufficient in itself), and McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 
1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the language of Regulation Z indicates that notice 
merely advances a claim seeking rescission, but does not exercise a borrower's right of 
rescission). 
 134. Congress intended to establish a fixed and limited repose period in § 1635(f) to ensure 
commercial certainty. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187. Without a firm and established time period 
for solidifying the legal relationship between lenders and borrowers, the “economic best interests 
of the public as a whole” could be upset. Id. at 1186. 
 135. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 12; see In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651, 656–57 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing Velazquez v. Home Am. Credit, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045 
(N.D. Ill. 2003)); Shepard, supra note 15, at 192. 
 136. Shepard, supra note 14, at 192. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 172. 
 139. Major Lescault, The Truth in Lending Act Means What It Says—You Only Have Three 
Years to Rescind, Aug. 1998 ARMY LAW. 28, 30. 
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application could prove harmful to borrowers’ leverage.140 
Therefore, even though the process of rescission is undoubtedly 
vague in other respects,141 certainty as to the availability of a 
borrower’s right to rescind is necessary to preserve the borrower’s 
limited leverage. 
C.  “Cloudy Titles”: The Negative Economic Ramifications 
of the Status Quo 
On the other hand, banks and other lenders must be “protected 
from the possibility that a foreclosed home could have a ‘cloudy 
title’ because of a delayed rescission claim by a borrower.”142 A title 
is “clouded” when a consumer can rescind a loan transaction after 
the property is disposed of in a foreclosure sale or the interest is 
subsequently assigned to a third party.143 However, such post-
foreclosure rescission is generally infeasible because foreclosed real 
estate is often purchased by innocent third parties, making it virtually 
impossible for the creditor to return the consumer to his or her pre-
contractual position144 unless the innocent purchaser is divested of 
his or her right in the real estate.145 The possibility that an innocent, 
bona fide third party purchaser could be divested of his or her right 
to property purchased at a foreclosure sale will certainly reduce the 
marketability of such property.146 
 
 140. See infra Part V.C; see also Griffith, supra note 95, at 350 (noting that if TILA permits 
no federal right of rescission after the expiration of the thee-year period, borrowers must look to 
state law for remedies in this context). 
 141. Neither TILA nor Regulation Z “set forth any technical requirements that govern the 
language a consumer must use when requesting a rescission.” Sam v. Am. Home Mortg. 
Servicing, No. CIV. S-09-2177, 2010 WL 761228, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2010). 
 142. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 143. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i)(1) (2006) (“[A]fter the initiation of any judicial or nonjudicial 
foreclosure process on the primary dwelling of an obligor securing an extension of credit, the 
obligor shall have a right to rescind the transaction equivalent to other rescission rights by this 
section.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2006) (“Any consumer who has the right to rescind a transaction 
under section 1635 of this title may rescind the transaction as against any assignee of the 
obligation.”); Jones v. Saxon Mortg., Inc., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 144. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (“[T]he creditor shall return to the boligor [sic] any money or 
property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary 
or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction.”). 
 145. Jones, 537 F.3d at 327. 
 146. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (“Any consumer who has the right to rescind a 
transaction under section 1635 of this title may rescind the transaction as against any assignee of 
the obligation.”). 
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Therefore, certainty as to a consumer’s right of rescission is 
necessary to protect the marketability of real estate purchased via 
foreclosure, and as a corollary, the economic interests of banks and 
other lenders. 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
In an effort to adhere to the congressional intent behind TILA 
and promote economic certainty, the Supreme Court should strike 
down the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Gilbert and expressly declare 
that consumers must initiate an action for rescission within the three-
year statutory period to effectively exercise their right to rescind 
under § 1635(f) and Regulation Z.147 The following analysis supports 
this proposal by examining the plain language of various provisions 
in TILA and Regulation Z, applying the applicable precedent in 
Beach, explaining the significance of § 1635(f) as a statute of repose, 
and weighing various policy considerations. 
A.  Start at the Source: A Plain Language Analysis 
of TILA and Regulation Z 
Under § 1635(f), “[a]n obligor’s right of rescission shall expire 
three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon 
the sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”148 In an effort to 
clarify § 1635(f), Regulation Z states that “[t]o exercise the right to 
rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by 
mail, telegram or other means of written communication.”149 
Significantly, neither § 1635(f) nor Regulation Z mentions a 
suit’s commencement.150 Hence, according to some courts, TILA 
does not require a consumer to file an action seeking rescission to 
 
 147. Alternatively, Congress could amend § 1635(f) to expressly require the filing of a 
rescission suit within three years of consummation of the loan or the Federal Reserve Board could 
amend Regulation Z to clarify that notice is necessary, but not sufficient to exercise the right to 
rescind under § 1635(f). However, because the effect of amended legislation and regulation on 
case law interpreting such legislation or regulation is ambiguous, this Note does not address these 
alternatives but acknowledges that they may also achieve the goals in the analysis of the proposal. 
For an in-depth discussion on precedent, see generally Mary Massaron Ross, An Advocate's 
Toolbox: Techniques to Help Appellate Lawyers Evaluate Precedent and Craft Analytically 
Precise Arguments, 81 MICH. BUS. L.J. 24 (2002). 
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
 149. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2008). 
 150. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998); Gilbert v. Residential 
Funding, LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651, 659 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2009). 
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exercise the right to rescind but requires only that notice be given to 
the creditor.151 In other words, there is a difference between the 
underlying right of rescission, exercised by notice pursuant to 
Regulation Z,152 and the effectuation of that rescission, accomplished 
through legal action.153 Thus, under this plain language analysis of 
§ 1635(f), when a consumer timely notifies her creditor of her 
intention to rescind the loan, § 1635 will not limit her ability to 
subsequently file suit to enforce that right.154 
However, the analysis above, adopted by the Fourth Circuit in 
Gilbert,155 misconstrues the underlying right of rescission. Instead, 
§ 1635(f) represents an “absolute limitation,”156 which “permits no 
federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year 
period of § 1635(f) has run.”157 According to the Supreme Court in 
Beach, § 1635(f)’s “uncompromising statement that the borrower’s 
right ‘shall expire’ with the running of time manifests a 
congressional intent to extinguish completely the right of rescission 
at the end of the 3-year period.”158 Importantly, the court noted, 
§ 1635(f) establishes a right of action that is “generally redressable 
only when a party seeks recognition of it by invoking the power of 
the courts.”159 Thus, mere notice will only signify the consumer’s 
intent to rescind rather than actually invoke his or her underlying 
 
 151. See Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278; Leonard v. Bank of Am., No. 10-C-0814, 2012 WL 
3001266, at *6 (E.D. Wis. July 23, 2012); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. at 659. 
 152. “To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission 
by mail, telegram or other means of written communication.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2013). 
 153. See Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277. 
 154. In re Hunter, 400 B.R. at 662; see also RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 403 ("The 
three-year period limits only the consumer's right to rescind, not the consumer's right to seek 
judicial enforcement of the rescission."). 
 155. See Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277–78. 
 156. McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002); King v. California, 784 
F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 157. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 419 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 410 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006)). 
 159. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012); see also McOmie-
Gray, 667 F.3d at 1327 (“Rescission is not automatic upon a borrower’s mere notice of 
rescission . . . . Instead, where a lender fails to comply with § 1635(b), the statute and regulations 
contemplate that a borrower, who by sending notice of rescission has ‘advanced a claim seeking 
rescission,’ will seek a determination that rescission is proper.” (quoting Large v. Conseco Fin. 
Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2002))). 
THE NEED TO CLARIFY  10/18/2014 10:51 AM 
2014] THE (UN)INFORMED USE OF CREDIT 853 
right of rescission. It follows then that a consumer must file an action 
in court to invoke her right of rescission under TILA.160 
When a statute fundamentally limits a litigant’s ability to file an 
action, it is said to be a “statute of repose.”161 “Unlike a statute of 
limitation, which regulates [the availability of] remedies, a statute of 
repose regulates [the underlying] rights and ‘operates as a statutory 
bar independent of the actions (or inaction) of the litigants.’”162 In 
other words, under a statute of repose, similar to § 1635(f), the right 
to relief (in this case to rescind the loan transaction) is completely 
extinguished when the relevant time period expires.163 
Furthermore, in reading the plain language of Regulation Z164 in 
combination with § 1635(f)’s repose language,165 it is apparent that 
these regulations suggest that notice is only a “necessary predicate 
act to the ultimate exercise of the right,”166 rather than a sufficient act 
constituting the exercise of the right. 
Therefore, in reading both § 1635(f) and Regulation Z under a 
plain language standard, consumers must actually bring an action for 
rescission within the three-year statutory period under § 1635(f) to 
exercise their right of rescission.167 Regulation Z clearly makes 
notice a necessary component of exercising the right of rescission, 
however, notice is not a sufficient condition to exercise such a 
right.168 If the consumer fails to bring an action within the three-year 
period, his or her right of rescission will be extinguished.169 
 
 160. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183; McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1329; see Barry v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, F.S.B., No. 10-cv-1525, 2011 WL 441508, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 
2011). 
 161. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1182–83. 
 162. Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 835 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 (D. Minn. 
2011) (quoting Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 163. See Margiolies v. Deason, 464 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 164. “To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission 
by mail, telegram or other means of written communication.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2013). 
 165. “An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation 
of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) 
(2006) (emphasis added). 
 166. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1185. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. at 1181 (citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 419 (1998)); McOmie-
Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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B.  The Real World: Examining Various Policy Considerations 
When interpreting the meaning of a statute, courts should 
explore the underlying concerns embodied in the statute, the intent of 
the legislature in drafting the statute, and the potential social and 
economic policy arguments in favor of differing interpretations. In 
the following sections, this Note argues that the proposal not only 
adheres to Congress’s original intent in drafting TILA and, more 
specifically, § 1635(f), but also supports sound economic policy. 
1.  Promoting Economic Stability 
TILA’s basic premise is to promote certainty in the lending 
marketplace to enable consumers and lenders to make 
knowledgeable decisions regarding credit transactions.170 However, 
the intended certainty quickly erodes to uncertainty when titles 
become “clouded”171 through ambiguous interpretations of § 1635(f) 
and Regulation Z. As discussed above, the Fourth Circuit’s decision 
in Gilbert established that a consumer, having provided sufficient 
notice of rescission to the lender within three years of discovering 
certain violations of TILA, may file a suit of rescission against the 
lender after the statutory three-year period found in § 1635(f) has 
run.172 The court in Gilbert then analogized the filing of an action of 
rescission to an action for damages under § 1640(e)173 for a violation 
of § 1635(b),174 thus limiting the rescission-tolling period to one 
year.175 However, the plain terms of § 1635(b)176 suggest that a 
 
 170. Jonathan Landers & Ralph Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 
UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 (1979). 
 171. See supra Part III.C. 
 172. See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012); In re Hunter, 
400 B.R. 651, 661–62 (Bankr. N.D. IL 2009); see also Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust 
2001–04, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16, 39–41 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that an action seeking rescission 
must be filed within one year of the date in which the lender refuses to effectuate rescission); In 
re Ralls, 230 B.R. 508, 512 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1999) (allowing a rescission suit where notice was 
sent within the three-year period and suit began less than one year after the lender refused to 
effectuate the rescission). 
 173. “Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in 
any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the 
violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006). 
 174. “Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the 
obligor any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall 
take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created 
under the transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). 
 175. Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278–79. 
 176. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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reaction by the creditor—such as returning any money or property, 
or taking any action necessary to terminate any security interest 
created under the transaction—is necessary to effectuate the 
rescission.177 Without a reaction by the creditor, there can be no 
mutual recognition of rescission.178 It must follow then that a 
creditor’s failure to respond to a consumer’s notice of rescission 
would not be considered a failure to act under § 1635(b) because 
unilateral notification cannot be construed as exercising the right to 
void a loan contract.179 Therefore, under the holding in Gilbert, a 
consumer could provide notice to a lender within the statutory three-
year period and proceed to sit on his or her rescission rights for an 
indeterminate amount of time.180 By allowing consumers to 
indefinitely toll the rescission period,181 the time period for 
solidifying the legal relationship between lenders and consumers 
expands beyond any statutory boundaries, thus “upset[ting] the 
economic best interests of the public as a whole.”182 
The indirect enlargement of the congressionally established 
three-year period could also spawn a multitude of “cloudy titles.”183 
According to § 1641(c), “[a]ny consumer who has the right to 
rescind a transaction under section 1635 of this title may rescind the 
transaction as against any assignee of the obligation.”184 
Furthermore, § 1635(i) states, “after the initiation of any judicial or 
nonjudicial foreclosure process on the primary dwelling of an obligor 
securing an extension of credit, the obligor shall have a right to 
rescind the transaction equivalent to other rescission rights provided 
by this section.”185 Thus, allowing a consumer to indefinitely extend 
the three-year period of rescission, or to extend it for any amount of 
time past the established three-year period, would put innocent 
bona fide purchasers and transferees of certain titles at risk of facing 
 
 177. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 n.11 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. (quoting Am. Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 821 (4th Cir. 
2007)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 835 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Minn. 
2011). 
 182. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1186 (alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. Saxon Mortg., 
Inc., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 183. See id. at 1187. 
 184. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2006). 
 185. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i) (2006). 
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a delayed rescission claim by the original consumer via §§ 1641(c) 
and 1635(f).186 This possibility would therefore create uncertainty in 
the chain of title of real estate purchased from foreclosure sales,187 
essentially defeating the intent to promote commercial-certainty that 
led Congress to establish the three-year repose period in the first 
place.188 Therefore, to further the congressional goal of commercial-
certainty, reduce the risk of “clouded titles,” and promote the best 
economic interests of the public, § 1635(f) and Regulation Z must 
establish a strict three-year period during which consumers can bring 
a suit of rescission. 
2.  Preserving Consumer Leverage 
As discussed above, the average consumer generally possesses 
comparatively less leverage in a loan transaction than his or her more 
sophisticated lending counterparts.189 Some commentators, 
examining this reality, have argued that the right of rescission is the 
singular source of consumer leverage in a damaged housing 
market190 and essentially levels the playing field by reducing the 
disparity in bargaining power that exists between consumers and 
lenders.191 In addition, as one court noted, lenders can enjoy ultimate 
protection against rescission claims under TILA by simply 
complying with the statutory disclosure provisions.192 Therefore, 
under the Gilbert reasoning, holding that notice is insufficient to 
exercise the consumer’s right of rescission would unfairly reward 
 
 186. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187 n.11. 
 187. See Jones, 537 F.3d at 327 (“[A]llowing tolling under § 1635(f) and permitting a party to 
rescind after a foreclosure sale would create uncertainty in any chain of title of real estate 
purchased from a foreclosure sale.”). 
 188. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187. 
 189. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 26, at 12; see also In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651, 656–
57 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (“‘The point of giving the consumer an absolute right to rescission is to 
place the consumer in a much stronger bargaining position than he enjoys under the traditional 
rules of rescission . . . .’” (quoting Velazquez v. Home Am. Credit, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d. 1043, 
1045 (N.D. Ill. 2003))); Shepard, supra note 14, at 192 (“TILA is designed to protect borrowers 
who, relative to lenders, are unsophisticated actors who possess less leverage in loan 
negotiations.”). 
 190. Shepard, supra note 14, at 172. 
 191. Lescault, supra note 139, at 30 (stating that with the proliferations of the home-equity 
market, TILA rescission rights have become an important weapon in the arsenal of consumer 
advocates). 
 192. Lippner v. Deutsche Nat'l Trust Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
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creditors for failing to respond to a consumer’s notice of rescission 
under § 1635(b).193 
However, contrary to the belief that consumers suffer from a 
grand disparity in bargaining power, borrowers in fact enjoy a wealth 
of leverage with respect to rescission. This calls into question the 
need for courts to extend the congressionally established three-year 
rescission period through judicial interpretation. First, courts will 
generally view facts in the light most favorable to consumers in 
TILA rescission claims and presume that the lenders did not make 
the required disclosures.194 As a result, in a rescission action, courts 
require only that the consumer produce enough evidence necessary 
to rebut the presumption of disclosure under TILA and thus 
withstand a motion for summary judgment.195 Ultimately, this  
non-arduous responsibility allows consumers to extend their 
rescission rights from three days to three years with relative ease 
under § 1635(f) and Regulation Z.196 
In addition, Congress and the Board, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, omitted any technical requirements governing the 
language a consumer must use when notifying the creditor that the 
consumer intends to rescind the contract.197 As a result, the vague 
statutory definition of required notice essentially prevents creditors 
 
 193. In re Hunter, 400 B.R. at 662; see also Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 
271, 277 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[A] borrower exercises her right of rescission by merely 
communicating in writing to her creditor her intention to rescind. To complete the rescission and 
void the contract, however, more is required. Either the creditor must ‘acknowledge[ ] that the 
right of rescission is available’ . . . or the borrower must file a lawsuit.” (quoting Am. Mortg. 
Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 821 (4th Cir. 2007))). 
 194. Barry v. Countrywide Home Loans, F.S.B., No. 10-cv-1525, 2011 WL 441508, at *2 (D. 
Colo. Feb. 8, 2011); see also Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 
(10th Cir. 2008) (“In considering a motion for summary judgment, this court draws all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”). 
 195. See Cappuccio v. Prime Capital Funding LLC, 649 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
quantum of evidence needed to ‘burst’ the presumption’s ‘bubble’ under Rule 301 is also 
minimal, given that ‘the presumption’s only effect is to require the party [contesting it] to produce 
enough evidence substantiating [the presumed fact’s absence] to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment or judgment as a matter of law on the issue.’” (quoting McCann v. Newman Irrevocable 
Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 2006))). 
 196. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2013) (“The consumer may exercise the right to rescind 
until midnight of the third business day following consummation . . . . If the required notice or 
material disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after 
consummation . . . .”). 
 197. Sam v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, No. CIV. S-09-2177, 2010 WL 761228 at *3 (E.D. 
Cal. Mar. 3, 2010). 
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from attacking the substance of a rescission notice, providing added 
protection for unsophisticated consumers.198 
In sum, the Supreme Court should invalidate the holding in 
Beach because it violates sound economic policy and gratuitously 
broadens consumer leverage at the expense of lender protection. In 
the following section, this Note proves that this proposal upholds the 
original congressional intent behind TILA, promotes increased 
economic strength and stability, and preserves consumer leverage in 
credit transactions. 
V.  JUSTIFICATION OF PROPOSAL 
As discussed in Part III of this Note, the current split of 
authority is problematic to both consumer interests and economic 
stability. In response, this Note proposed above that the Supreme 
Court should strike down the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Gilbert.199 
In the following sections, this Note will justify that proposal by 
providing that it supports and embraces the original congressional 
intent behind TILA and furthers economic policy and consumer 
interest considerations. 
A.  Congress Would Approve: How the Proposal 
Satisfies Congressional Intent 
Congress enacted TILA to provide consumers with tangible 
protection in credit transactions200 through increased transparency201 
and the promotion of the “informed use of credit.”202 According to 
Congress, the “informed use of credit” would also enhance economic 
stabilization and “competition among the various financial 
institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer 
credit.”203 However, as discussed above, the existing state of the law, 
encapsulated in a circuit split, fails to achieve this legislative 
intent.204 For how can consumers be “informed” if their own rights 
 
 198. See id. (“Defendants contend that a notice of rescission must be unequivocal. . . . 
[However,] neither TILA and Regulation Z, which implements TILA, set forth any technical 
requirements that govern the language a consumer must use when requesting a rescission.”). 
 199. See supra Part IV. 
 200. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). 
 201. Shepard, supra note 14, at 185. 
 202. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See supra Part III. 
THE NEED TO CLARIFY  10/18/2014 10:51 AM 
2014] THE (UN)INFORMED USE OF CREDIT 859 
are indefinite and ill expounded? Similarly, how can economic 
stabilization and competition be enhanced when some jurisdictions 
allow consumers to indefinitely toll certain rights,205 while others 
restrict those very same rights to statutorily defined periods?206 As 
noted in Rosenfield, allowing any uncertainty with respect to the 
statutory three-year rescission period would “run counter to the 
commercial-certainty concerns of Congress (recognized in Beach) 
that led Congress to establish the fixed and limited repose period of 
§ 1635(f) in the first place.”207 
Striking down Gilbert, as this Note proposes, would adhere to 
Congress’s intent to both protect consumers and promote economic 
certainty. The consumer would retain the right to rescind the contract 
within the statutory three-year period, thus preserving an essential 
part of the protective scheme of TILA. In addition, confining the 
consumer’s rescission rights to the statutory language of § 1635(f), 
by holding that a consumer must actually bring suit for rescission 
within the statutory three-year period, would eliminate the possibility 
that an innocent third-party purchaser of real estate or assignee of a 
mortgage could be divested of her interest after the statutory three-
year period has run.208 In turn, the confinement of rescission rights to 
the statutory three-year period would promote economic certainty in 
the lending market, and thus, prevent a foreseeable reduction in the 
marketability of property secured by mortgages and interests in 
mortgages. Clearly, the preservation of the marketability of property 
and interests in mortgages sustain the best economic interests of both 
lenders and consumers.209 Therefore, striking down Gilbert is 
 
 205. See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 206. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012); McOmie-Gray v. Bank 
of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 207. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187. 
 208. See Jones v. Saxon Mortg., Inc., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635(i) (2006) (explaining the obligor’s right to rescind the transaction after the initiation of 
judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings); 15 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2006) (explaining that any 
consumer that has a right to rescind under § 1635 may rescind the transaction as against any 
assignee of the obligation). 
 209. See Jones, 537 F.3d at 327 (“Given these differences between statutes of limitations and 
statutes of repose, it is understandable that a statute of limitations is tolled by a defendant’s 
fraudulent concealment. To disallow tolling when a defendant has fraudulently concealed an 
injury would permit a defendant to use a device, that was created out of considerations of 
fairness, inequitably. Similarly, it is easy to understand why a statute of repose is typically an 
absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason. To 
permit tolling of a statute of repose would upset the economic best interests of the public as a 
whole.” (citations omitted)). 
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consistent with the legislature’s intent to protect consumers while 
simultaneously promoting economic certainty. 
B.  Removing the Clouds: How the Proposal 
Promotes Economic Certainty 
The holding in Gilbert effectively permits consumers to 
indefinitely toll their rescission rights, potentially resulting in 
economic uncertainty, “clouded titles,” and reduced marketability of 
foreclosed real estate.210 However, the Supreme Court possesses the 
authority to circumscribe these latent economic risks by striking 
down Gilbert and expressly upholding Rosenfield and Beach. As this 
Note has proposed, the Court should exercise this authority in an 
attempt to restore economic certainty to the consumer credit 
marketplace. 
Striking down Gilbert would prevent consumers from 
unilaterally and indirectly enlarging the congressionally established 
rescission period.211 Under Rosenfield, consumers must bring suit for 
rescission within three years after the date of consummation,212 or 
earlier if the property was sold.213 Thus, both lenders and consumers, 
knowing that a rescission claim could be brought no later than three 
years after consummation, would be able to structure their respective 
affairs accordingly, thereby reducing the risk of economic 
uncertainty, “clouded titles,” and diminishing real estate 
marketability. For example, a lender that fails to disclose certain 
information required by TILA would know, under this Note’s 
proposed invalidation of Gilbert, that the original consumer could 
rescind the contract no later than three years after the date of 
consummation.214 Thus, the lender, and other potential actors in the 
marketplace, could consciously avoid assignment or acquisition of 
loans burdened by possible rescission claims, thereby reducing the 
risk of third parties obtaining interest in the loan or property subject 
to potential divestment215 and preserving the marketability of such 
 
 210. See supra Part III.C. 
 211. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187. 
 212. Id. (citing McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 213. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006). 
 214. See supra Part IV. 
 215. See Jones v. Saxon Mortg., Inc., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635(i)(1) (“[A]fter the initiation of any judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure process on the 
primary dwelling of an obligor securing an extension of credit, the obligor shall have a right to 
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property.216 Similarly, as discussed in further detail below,217 
consumers would benefit from a strict repose interpretation of 
§ 1635(f) and Regulation Z because their decision to rescind must 
involve a calculation of whether they are able to tender the required 
obligations to the lender upon rescission.218 If consumers know that 
rescission is prohibited beyond a set date, the required market 
foresight is reduced, making the calculation simpler and more 
precise. Hence, consumers can more accurately predict the economic 
consequences of rescission and, as a result, make an “informed” 
decision.219 
In addition, invalidating Gilbert would clarify and elucidate the 
process of exercising legally effective rescission.220 Gilbert suggests 
that sending notice is sufficient to exercise rescission under § 1635(f) 
and Regulation Z.221 Gilbert then goes on to apply a one-year statute 
of limitations from the date of the TILA violation for bringing a suit 
for rescission under § 1640(e).222 However, other courts, including 
the Supreme Court, have refused to apply the Fourth Circuit’s 
§ 1640(e) test and have held that declaring notice of rescission as 
sufficient to exercise the right of rescission under § 1635(f) 
indefinitely tolls the rescission period.223 It follows then that under 
Gilbert, a consensus among the judiciary regarding the post-notice 
limitation period is necessary to clearly and accurately define 
consumers’ rescission rights. Currently, that consensus does not 
exist. By striking down Gilbert and upholding the principles in 
Beach and Rosenfield, the Court would determinatively define the 
rescission process as consisting of a necessary, but insufficient notice 
 
rescind the transaction equivalent to other rescission rights provided by this section . . . .”); 15 
U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2006) (“Any consumer who has the right to rescind a transaction under section 
1635 of this title may rescind the transaction as against any assignee of the obligation.”). 
 216. See Jones, 537 F.3d at 327. 
 217. See infra Part V.C. 
 218. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006). 
 219. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). 
 220. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172, 1188 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[N]otice, by 
itself, is not sufficient to exercise (or preserve) a consumer's right of rescission under TILA. The 
commencement of a lawsuit within the three-year TILA repose period [is] required.”). 
 221. Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 222. “Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in 
any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the 
violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006); see Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278–79. 
 223. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417–19 (1998); Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 
1186–87; Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 835 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Minn. 
2011). 
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requirement, followed by a necessary and sufficient suit for 
rescission within the three-year statutory period.224 
In conclusion, by invalidating Gilbert, the Supreme Court can 
enhance economic certainty, reduce the risk of “clouded titles,” and 
clarify the process and requirements of consumer rescission. 
C.  A Consumer’s Friend:  
How the Proposal Protects Consumers 
As discussed above, consumers generally possess less leverage 
in loan negotiations than their lending counterparts.225 Nonetheless, 
as a result of Congress’s inclusion of § 1635(f) in TILA,226 which 
substantially liberalized the steps necessary to unwind loan 
transactions, TILA has shifted a significant amount of leverage from 
lenders to consumers.227 However, the added leverage from the 
rescission provisions is only palpable if the application of § 1635(f) 
is unambiguous. For example, when a consumer rescinds a loan 
agreement under TILA, he or she generally refinances his or her 
mortgage or sells his or her home and uses the proceeds from one of 
these transactions to return the lender to the status quo ante per the 
statutory requirements in § 1635(b).228 But in today’s depressed 
housing market, many consumers cannot afford to immediately 
tender their obligations upon rescission because the value of their 
homes has significantly decreased between the time the consumer 
refinanced the mortgage and when he or she sought rescission under 
§ 1635(f), meaning that neither refinancing, nor the sale of his or her 
 
 224. See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1188. 
 225. See supra Part III.B. 
 226.  
TILA’s legislative history provides little guidance as to the precise reasons Congress 
created the rescission remedy. It is clear that Congress intended to protect homeowners 
from abuse by dishonest home improvement contractors who made questionable 
“home improvements” financed by loans secured by borrowers' homes. Beyond this 
articulated concern, however, courts and the Federal Reserve Board have little 
information about rescission's precise origins.  
Shepard, supra note 14, at 191–92 (citations omitted). 
 227. Id. at 192. 
 228. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006) (“Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, 
the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as earnest money, 
downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the 
termination of any security interest created under the transaction. . . . Upon the performance of 
the creditor's obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor, 
except that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor 
shall tender its reasonable value.”). 
THE NEED TO CLARIFY  10/18/2014 10:51 AM 
2014] THE (UN)INFORMED USE OF CREDIT 863 
home, will cover the consumer’s tender obligations.229 Therefore, if 
the three-year period for rescission in § 1635(f) is extended 
indefinitely or for an additional year under § 1640(e), as in Gilbert, 
consumers risk losing the ability to tender their obligations upon 
rescission by sitting on their rights too long. Consumers must “fish or 
cut bait”—and an unquestionable and definite repose period would 
set a final “cut bait” point with which to base the decision of whether 
to rescind. If consumers knew that they had only three years to 
exercise their right to rescind a contract and thereby be forced to 
tender any obligation necessary to return the lender to the status quo 
ante, consumers would then be able to make an informed decision 
whether to rescind—and when to rescind—based on the current and 
forecasted market information. Thus, a strict three-year statutory 
limit on the right of rescission is necessary to protect consumers’ 
leverage from their own potential misinformation or miscalculation. 
With a hardline three-year limit on the right to rescind, consumers 
can plan accordingly and do not run the risk of stretching their 
rescission rights passed the three-year period in hopes of economic 
rebound, only to find further market depression, thus preventing the 
consumer from tendering their obligations in full per § 1635(b) and 
ultimately leading to dismissal of the rescission claim.230 
In conclusion, the proposal laid out above supports the original 
congressional intent behind the passage of TILA, promotes a stable 
economic environment, and preserves and protects consumer 
leverage in credit transactions. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The split of authority regarding consumers’ right to rescind 
credit transactions under TILA presents substantial risks to the 
underlying objectives of the consumer protection legislation. If the 
 
 229.  
Although courts have the equitable authority to modify consumers’ tender obligations 
by allowing consumers to repay the net loan proceeds in installments, most courts have 
treated consumers' repayment obligations in an all-or-nothing fashion: consumers are 
required to tender in full immediately or within a short time, or their rescission claims 
are eventually dismissed. 
Shepard, supra note 14, at 198. 
 230. “[I]f the court finds that ‘the borrower cannot comply with [her] rescission obligations 
no matter what,’ a court can dismiss the rescission action before deciding whether the defendants 
committed a material disclosure error.” Shepard, supra note 14, at 201 (quoting Yamamoto v. 
Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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holding in Gilbert is allowed to survive as good law, consumers will 
suffer the worst of the consequences. They will be forced to 
participate in an unpredictable and instable lending marketplace, 
with the looming risk of foreclosure weighing on them, and with 
weakened and ill-defined rights providing unsatisfactory protection 
from unfair credit practices and foreclosure. The Supreme Court 
needs to invalidate Gilbert and consolidate judicial consensus by 
upholding Rosenfield and Beach. In doing so, as this Note has put 
forth, the Court would support the congressional intent underlying 
TILA and Regulation Z, prevent economic uncertainty and 
instability, and preserve the necessary leverage and rights of 
consumers. 
 
